Files
Maciej Lisiewski acda412f93 test(dashboard): pin backslash X-Forwarded-Prefix rejection on the login form; fix is_safe_next_path summary
normalise_prefix's backslash rejection is what keeps the password form's
fetch(data-prefix + '/auth/password-login') on-origin; nothing failed when it
was removed. The is_safe_next_path summary claimed space forms are rejected;
spaces are deliberately allowed.

Co-authored-by: BearHuddleston <196404565+BearHuddleston@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-13 13:57:23 +01:00

169 lines
7.8 KiB
Python

"""Request-level helpers shared by the auth routes and both middlewares."""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import time
from typing import Callable, Optional
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
from fastapi import Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_session_providers
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.base import DashboardAuthProvider, ProviderError
# Paths a post-login redirect must never land on: the auth flow itself (would loop) and any
# ``/api/*`` target (raw JSON in the address bar, indistinguishable from a weaponised redirect).
_NEXT_DENY_PREFIXES = ("/login", "/auth/", "/api/auth/")
def client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
"""ASGI peer address for rate limits, native pending caps, and auth audit.
Never parse client-supplied ``X-Forwarded-For`` here: direct clients can
spoof it. Trusted proxy normalization belongs upstream, where the server
may rewrite ``request.client`` only for operator-configured trusted peers.
"""
return request.client.host if request.client else ""
def extract_bearer(request: Request) -> str:
"""``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` value (scheme case-insensitive), or ``""``."""
parts = request.headers.get("authorization", "").split(" ", 1)
if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0].strip().lower() == "bearer":
return parts[1].strip()
return ""
def _http_origin(value: str) -> tuple[str, str, int] | None:
"""Parse one serialized HTTP origin, never an opaque or URL-like origin."""
if not value or any(ord(c) <= 32 or ord(c) >= 127 or c in "\\,?#%" for c in value):
return None
try:
parsed = urlsplit(value)
if (parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname
or parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None or parsed.path
or parsed.netloc.endswith(":")):
return None
port = parsed.port
effective_port = port if port is not None else (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
return parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, effective_port
except ValueError:
return None
def cookie_origin_is_allowed(request: Request) -> bool:
"""Cookie writes must come from the listener's own origin, not just its site. The gate asks
only where the surface policy says so (``SurfacePolicy.own_origin_cookie_writes``: the
gateway's Webapp); elsewhere the gate refuses only writes the browser marks as another page's.
``SameSite=Lax`` keeps cross-site pages from sending the session cookies but
still admits same-site siblings (another port or subdomain). A write without
Origin passes only in a shape no page can produce (native Desktop's own
requests), and only after the Host guard. With an Origin, the browser's
``Sec-Fetch-Site`` verdict decides when present: pages cannot set it, and the
browser computes it against the URL it actually addressed, so it stays right
behind a TLS-terminating or Host-rewriting proxy where this server's view of
its own URL differs. Only a browser without Fetch Metadata falls back to
comparing Origin with the OAuth public-URL authority, otherwise the request's
Host and ASGI scheme (uvicorn applies *trusted* proxy headers). Never trust
raw forwarded headers here or reuse WS's opaque/non-HTTP Origin exemption.
"""
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import resolve_public_url
from hermes_cli.web_server import _is_accepted_host
bound_host = getattr(request.app.state, "bound_host", None)
if bound_host and not _is_accepted_host(
request.headers.get("host", ""), bound_host,
getattr(request.app.state, "trusted_public_hosts", frozenset()),
):
return False
origins = request.headers.getlist("origin")
fetch_sites = request.headers.getlist("sec-fetch-site")
if not origins:
# Electron's net.request sends Sec-Fetch-Site: none to https and loopback, and no Fetch
# Metadata to plain http. Pages attach Origin to every non-GET and keep none for typed GETs.
return fetch_sites in ([], ["none"])
origin = _http_origin(origins[0]) if len(origins) == 1 else None
if origin is None:
return False
if fetch_sites:
return fetch_sites == ["same-origin"]
target = urlsplit(resolve_public_url(request.app.state) or str(request.url))
return origin == _http_origin(f"{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}")
def is_same_origin_path(path: str) -> bool:
"""Root-relative path a browser cannot resolve off-origin: no ``//`` lead, no backslash, no
control character (WHATWG collapses ``\\`` to ``/`` and strips tab/CR/LF before parsing)."""
if not path.startswith("/") or path.startswith("//"):
return False
return "\\" not in path and not any(ord(ch) < 0x20 or ch == "\x7f" for ch in path)
def is_safe_next_path(path: str) -> bool:
"""Same-origin post-login target: rejects non-relative and protocol-relative (``//evil``)
values, the backslash/control forms browsers normalise into them, the auth routes
themselves, and every ``/api`` path.
Browsers parse ``/\\evil`` as ``//evil`` (WHATWG URL collapses ``\\`` to ``/`` in
special-scheme URLs) and strip tab/CR/LF anywhere before parsing (``/\t/evil`` is
``//evil``), so a string-prefix check alone cannot decide origin: any backslash or control
character is rejected fail-closed. A space never moves the authority, so it stays allowed
(deep links carry decoded ``%20`` queries).
"""
if not is_same_origin_path(path):
return False
if any(path == p or path.startswith(p) for p in _NEXT_DENY_PREFIXES):
return False
return not (path == "/api" or path.startswith("/api/"))
def access_token_max_age(session) -> int:
"""Cookie Max-Age for the access token: seconds to ``exp``, floored at 60."""
return max(60, int(session.expires_at) - int(time.time()))
def unreachable_response(provider_name: str) -> JSONResponse:
"""503 for a transient IDP/backing-store outage (never a forced re-login)."""
return JSONResponse({"detail": f"Auth provider {provider_name!r} unreachable"}, status_code=503)
def scan_session_providers(
provider_hint: Optional[str], call: Callable[[DashboardAuthProvider], object], *, phase: str,
log: logging.Logger, swallow: tuple[type[BaseException], ...] = (),
on_swallow: Optional[Callable[[DashboardAuthProvider], None]] = None,
on_unreachable: Optional[Callable[[DashboardAuthProvider], None]] = None):
"""Run ``call`` across the session providers; first non-``None`` result or ``None``.
The hinted provider goes first (stable sort; a stale/unknown hint leaves registration order
intact). ``swallow`` exceptions reject that candidate only. A ``ProviderError`` (IDP/JWKS
unreachable) must NOT abort the chain — the credential may belong to a different, reachable
provider; it is logged under ``phase`` and, if nothing else succeeds, re-raised as
``ProviderError(name)`` so the caller answers 503 instead of forcing a re-login.
"""
providers = list_session_providers()
if provider_hint:
providers.sort(key=lambda provider: provider.name != provider_hint)
unreachable: Optional[str] = None
for provider in providers:
try:
result = call(provider)
except swallow:
if on_swallow is not None:
on_swallow(provider)
continue
except ProviderError as e:
log.warning("dashboard-auth: provider %r unreachable during %s: %s",
provider.name, phase, e)
if on_unreachable is not None:
on_unreachable(provider)
if unreachable is None:
unreachable = provider.name
continue
if result is not None:
return result
if unreachable is not None:
raise ProviderError(unreachable)
return None